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Abstract
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we
focus on a new condition: “update monotonicity” for preference rules. Although many so-called
impossibility theorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions,
this appealing condition is satisfied by several non-trivial preference rules. In fact, in case of
pairwise, Pareto optimal, neutral, and consistent rules; the Kemeny-Young rule is singled out
by this condition. In case of convex valued, Pareto optimal, neutral and replication invariant
rules; strong update monotonicity implies that the rule equals the union of preferences which
extend all preference pairs unanimously agreed upon by k agents, where k is related to the
number of alternatives and agents. In both cases, it therewith provides a characterization of
these rules.
JEL Classification: D63, D71, D72
Keywords: Update monotonicity, Preferences, Aggregation, Kemeny-Young Method
1 Introduction
Consider a collective decision making problem where, by means of a preference correspondence1,
individual strict preferences, i.e. complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relations over a set
of alternatives, are aggregated into a set of strict preferences. For instance, to appoint a new dean,
a committee of department representatives collectively ranks three candidates: A(lice), B(ill) and
C(aroline). Let the outcome be such that A is ranked the best, B is second best and C is ranked
the lowest. Suppose now that one of the representatives, preferring C above B and both these
above A, is substituted by another member of that department with preference A above C above
B. Clearly, the latter preference agrees on more ordered pairs of the outcome than the former does
and it only differs with the outcome on pairs where the former differs with the outcome. So to
speak, the latter preference is an “update” of the former towards the outcome. The question raised
here is whether in the new hypothetical situation the outcome would still be A above B above C.
Take a (preference) profile, i.e. a combination of individual preferences, and a possible outcome
of a preference correspondence. By updating, we refer to transformations of the profile such that the
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Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands; E-mail: b.can@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Authors are grateful to
Bettina Klaus, Kristof Bosmans and Tuba Korkmaz for their comments on earlier drafts. The support of Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under the grant with project nr. 400-09-354, is gratefully acknowledged.
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1Set valuedness of an aggregation rule may reflect the possible outcomes of neutral tie-breaking.
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individual preferences change only in parts where they differ from the given outcome. Therewith,
these transformations yield profiles which are more similar to the outcome and which are, in a sense,
updates towards it. A preference correspondence is said to be update monotone if the outcome is
still chosen at such a transformation. Strong update monotonicity, moreover, requires that the
outcomes at the updated profile form a subset of the previous set of outcomes.
For collective choice functions and choice correspondences (for simplicity referred to as choice
rules) various monotonicity conditions have been studied intensively. Well-known impossibility
theorems, such as in Muller and Satterthwaite (1977), express that only trivial choice rules such
as dictatorial rules or constant rules are monotone. Therefore, imposing this type of condition to
choice rules can seem too restrictive. Furthermore, when defining a monotonicity condition for a
choice rule, the description of a preference change in favour of an alternative is not completely
free of contamination. For instance, extending the lower contour set of a winning alternative, as in
Maskin monotonicity, assumes that these choice rules should not depend on how these lower contour
sets are ordered individually. In the case of preference rules and update monotonicity, however,
demanding that individual preferences can only change as far as they differ from the outcome is at
least intuitively more sound. Furthermore monotonicity conditions have not yet been analyzed for
preference rules.
In comparison to these monotonicity conditions for choice rules, we draw the conclusion that the
ones presented here for preference rules seem less restrictive. Indeed, imposing update monotonicity
on preference rules along with other conditions, which are satisfied by many well-known preference
rules, yields characterizations of “Kemeny-Young” and “super majority” preference rules. The main
reason for this is that compared to choice rules, the framework of preference rules allows for more
detail in expressing monotonicity.
In the choice function framework it is also well-known that the aforementioned impossibil-
ity theorems based on monotonicity conditions correspond to some impossibility theorems based
on strategy-proofness conditions. In the preference rule framework, Bossert and Storcken (1992)
showed that there exists no coalitional strategy-proof welfare function, i.e., single valued preference
correspondence, which is in addition nonimposed and weak extrema independent. However, for
welfare functions update monotonicity is compatible with these two latter conditions as is discussed
in Section 5.
Update monotonicity is discussed for two disjoint cases; the first in which we assume that
preference rules are convex valued and the second where this is not required. In the first case we
determine the class of Pareto optimal, neutral, replication invariant, convex valued and strongly
update monotone preference rules. It consists of super majority rules. At these rules, depending
on the number of alternatives and the number of individuals, a number k close to the number
of agents n is fixed. Now these correspondences assign all preferences which extend all ordered
pairs unanimously agreed upon by any set of at least k individuals. This result characterizes super
majority rules as the only preference rules that satisfy the five conditions mentioned above. Pareto
optimality, neutrality and replication invariance are conditions met by many well-known preference
correspondences. Whenever set valued outcomes stem from tie breaking indifferences, the convexity
requirement on these outcome sets means that indifferences are broken in every possible way. Many
well-known preference correspondences are convex valued. The characterization of super majority
rules therefore implies that many well-known rules, such as the Borda (1784) and the Copeland
(1951) rule, are not strongly update monotone. Moreover, in deducing this characterization of super
majority rules we have the following result based on Pareto optimality, anonymity, neutrality, convex
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valuedness and update monotonicity only. Consider profiles where the set of agents is partitioned
into two groups such that all members in each group report the same preference and the two
reported preferences differ on precisely one consecutively ordered pair of alternatives only. At these
profiles, which in fact resemble a decision situation on two alternatives, the outcome is both of
these preferences if no group has more than m−1m n agents, where m is the number of alternatives
and n the number of agents. So, in case of 3 alternatives a 23 majority is not decisive in such a
situation. This result shows that many well-known rules do not satisfy update monotonicity. In the
setting of convex valued preference rules, the strong version of update monotonicity is necessary
for the characterization of super majority rules. The logical independence of these characterizing
conditions is discussed by examples; and furthermore, the necessity of the stronger version of update
monotonicity is shown.
Next, consider the situation of possibly non-convex valued outcomes. The Kemeny-Young pref-
erence correspondence (simply the Kemeny rule), assigning those strict preferences to a given profile
which minimize the sum of Kemeny distance to all of the individual preferences in the profile, is
update monotone. It is, however, not convex valued. For instance in case of three alternatives at
a Condorcet profile, unlike many preference correspondences having all six strict preferences in the
outcome, it only assigns the three preferences reported in the profile. The Kemeny rule is the only
rule which is Pareto optimal, consistent, pairwise, neutral and update monotone. The former four
conditions are well-known and satisfied by various preference rules. Comparing the two characteri-
zations, we see a substitution of convexity by pairwiseness and a trade off between a strengthening
of replication invariance to consistency and a weakening of update monotonicity.
Young and Levenglick (1978) characterized the Kemeny rule by neutrality, consistency and the
Condorcet condition. A major step in their proof is that given a profile, outcomes assigned by
rules satisfying these three conditions are determined by a pairwise difference matrix which records
the numerical differences of pairwise comparisons in its cell. That is, if two profiles yield the same
pairwise difference matrix, then the outcomes at these two profiles are equal. Herewith such rules
are pairwise. A similar result can be found in Lemma 11. From that point on, because of the
differences in the characterizing conditions, the line of arguments and, hence, the proofs differ
completely. In addition to the logical independence of the five conditions we employ, we also show
their logical equivalence to those used by Young and Levenglick
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we provide some notation for our model and briefly
discuss certain properties including update monotonicity, and provide examples of some rules to
which we refer in the later sections. Section 3 is devoted to the class of convex valued rules. An
intuition is provided on why many convex valued rules are not update monotone. Thereafter,
we provide a characterization of the family of super majority correspondences as indicated above.
Section 4 discusses preference correspondences where convex valuedness is dropped and here we
provide a new characterization of the Kemeny rule based on update monotonicity. In Section 5,
we discuss the findings, such as the logical independence of the characterizing conditions and their
logical equivalence to the conditions of Young and Levenglick. Furthermore, some weakening and
strengthening of update monotonicity are formulated and discussed briefly. Finally, we show that
in the social welfare setting of Bossert and Storcken (1992), update monotonicity is less demanding
than strategy-proofness.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Notation
Let A be a finite set of alternatives with cardinality #A = m > 1. Preferences are taken to be linear
orders over the set of alternatives A. Let L denote the set of all preferences over A. Let N be a
countable infinite set of potential agents. For non-empty and finite subsets N of N with cardinality
n, LN denotes the set of all preference profiles p, i.e., an n-dimensional vector of preferences where
its ith component p (i) refers to individual i’s preference. The restriction of profile p to a subset of
agents, say S, is denoted by p|S . For situations where two disjoint sets of agents N,N ′ ∈ N , with
preference profiles p ∈ LN , and q ∈ LN ′ over the same set of alternatives are united, we interpret
(p, q) as the union2 of these two profiles, i.e., (p, q) ∈ LN∪N ′ with (p, q)(i) = p(i) if i ∈ N and
(p, q)(i) = q(i) if i ∈ N ′. Furthermore, for a coalition S, a nonempty subset of N , and a linear
order R, let RS denote the profile p where p(i) = R for all i in S. So, RN denotes the the unanimous
profile in which all agents in N have preference R. A preference correspondence or simply a rule
ϕ, is a function such that for every finite and non-empty set N ⊂ N , ϕ assigns a nonempty subset
ϕ(p) of L, to each preference profile p in LN .
Let R be a linear order on A. Consider three different alternatives a, b, c ∈ A. Note that because
of anti-symmetry of R, (a, b) ∈ R means that a is strictly preferred to b, which hereafter will be
denoted by “.a.b. = R”. The case where a and b are consecutive at R, i.e., there is no alternative c
that is ordered in between a and b, is denoted by .ab. = R. Notations like .a.b.c. = R and .ab.c. = R
have the obvious interpretation. Furthermore a... = R means that alternative a is ordered best at
R and likewise ...b = R means that alternative b is ordered worst at R. Let P be a partial order, i.e.
an anti-symmetric, reflexive, and transitive binary relation on A. Then, LP = {R ∈ L : P ⊆ R}
denotes the set of linear extensions of P . To save parenthesis, we write Lab instead of L{(a,b)}.
Let a1a2...al−1alal+1...am = R and a1a2...al−1al+1al...am = R. Then we say R (respectively R)
is an elementary change of R (R) in pair alal+1 (al+1al) or R and R form an elementary change
(in al and al+1). Furthermore this elementary change is in position l, i.e., the l
th and (l + 1)
th
alternatives are swapped.
Given a nonempty subset of alternatives B ⊆ A, let R|B denote the restriction of an order R
to B, i.e., R|B = {(x, y) ∈ R : x, y ∈ B}. In a similar way let p|B be the restriction of a profile p
to B, i.e., (p|B)(i) = p(i)|B for every agent i in N .
For preferences R1, R2, and R3, we say R3 is between3 R1 and R2 if and only if R1 ∩R2 ⊆ R3.
The Kemeny distance (Kemeny, 1959; Kemeny and Snell, 1962) for two linear orders R1 and R2 is
defined by δ(R1, R2) = 12#((R
1 − R2) ∪ (R2 − R1)) = #(R1 − R2), i.e., half of the cardinality of
the symmetric difference of R1 and R2. Note that δ is a distance function and hence satisfies the
triangular inequality. Furthermore, for any three linear orders; R1, R2 and R3, we have:
δ(R1, R3) + δ(R3, R2) = δ(R1, R2) if and only if R3 is between R1 and R2.
Finally let S be a nonempty subset of L. S is convex if for all R1 and R2 in S, and for all R3 in L,
R3 is also in S if R3 is between R1 and R2. In Bogart (1973) there is a discussion of betweenness
and the concept of convexity. In Storcken (2008), the following characterization can be found:
2We abuse notation by dropping parentheses whenever it is clear that we refer to the union of these two set of
agents.
3For general relations also the condition R3 ⊆ R1 ∪ R2 is needed. In case of linear orders, this, however, is
equivalent to R1 ∩R2 ⊆ R3.
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Proposition 1 Let S be a subset of L. Then the following two are equivalent(i) S is convex,(ii)
There is a partial order P such that LP = S.
2.2 Properties of Rules
Next we discuss some properties for preference correspondences that we will use in the following
sections.
Single valuedness: A rule is single valued if the outcome at every profile is a singleton, i.e. is a
set of precisely one linear order. Clearly, this condition means that the rule is a function. In the
literature these functions are also known as welfare functions.
Pareto Optimality: The Pareto condition requires that all preferences assigned to a profile are
Pareto optimal. Formally: ϕ(p) ⊆ L∩{p(i):i∈N} for all profiles p in LN .
Anonymity: Anonymity requires that all individuals are treated equally; hence, renaming them
should not change the outcome, i.e. ϕ (p) = ϕ (p ◦ pi) for all profiles p in LN and all permutations
pi of N , where p ◦ pi is the profile such that p ◦ pi (i) = p (pi (i)) for all i ∈ N .
Neutrality: A rule is said to be neutral whenever it treats alternatives in a neutral way: τ(ϕ(p)) =
ϕ(τp) for all profiles p in LN and all permutation τ of A, where τ extends to any relation R on A
by τ(R) = {(τ(a), τ(b)) : (a, b) ∈ R}, τ(S) = {τ(R) : R ∈ S} denotes the complete image of a set S
under τ and τp is defined for an individual i by (τp)(i) = τ(p(i)).
Replication Invariance: Replication invariance means that the outcome of a rule is the same
before and after the replication of a profile: ϕ(p) = ϕ(p1, p2, ..., pk) for all profiles p, p1, p2, ... and
pk in respectively LN ,LN1 ,LN2 ... and LNk such that N, N1, N2...Nk are all pairwise disjoint and
there are bijections σt from N to Nt for all t ∈ {1, 2, ...k} such that p(i) = pt(σt(i)) for all i in N
and (p1, p2, ..., pk) is the profile say q on N1 ∪N2 ∪ ...Nk, with q(i) = pt(i) for all i ∈ Nt.
Consistency: Consistency requires that the outcome assigned to a profile, which is composed of
two disjoint sets of individuals that are merged, equals the intersection of the outcomes assigned to
the profiles of these sets of individuals separately, whenever this intersection is non-empty. Formally:
ϕ(p)∩ϕ(q) = ϕ(p, q) for all profiles p and q in respectively LN and LM where N and M are disjoint
and ϕ(p) ∩ ϕ(q) 6= ∅.
Pairwiseness: A rule is pairwise if the outcomes at two profiles are equal whenever every pairwise
comparison in a profile is numerically equal to that in the other profile. Formally: ϕ(p) = ϕ(q) for
all profiles p and q in LN such that M(p) = M(q), where M(p) is a m by m matrix such that for
alternatives a and b, cell (a, b) is defined by the number of agents preferring a to b:
M(p)(a,b) = #{i ∈ N : (a, b) ∈ p(i)} if a 6= b
= 0 if a = b.
Convex valuedness: A rule satisfies convex valuedness if it assigns to each profile a convex set
of linear orders: ϕ(p) is convex for all profiles p in LN .
Remark 1 Note that replication invariance implies anonymity, and consistency implies replication
invariance. 4
Below we provide some examples of convex valued rules:
Example 1 (Score rules) Let −→s = (s1, ...sm) be the score vector over the set of alternatives
such that s1 ≥ ... ≥ sm and s1 > sm. Let rank (a, p (i)) = # {b ∈ A : .b.a. = p (i) or a = b} , i.e.
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the rank of alternative a in ith preference p(i) equals the the number of alternatives preferred or
indifferent to a. For each alternative a ∈ A, let score (−→s , a, p) = ∑i∈N srank(a,p(i)) be the sum of
scores of alternative a in each individual preference p (i) in the profile p. Consider the partial order
P−→s (p) = (a, b) : score (
−→s , a, p) > score (−→s , b, p) or a = b}. The score rule ϕ−→s induced by the score
vector −→s equals is defined for profile p by
ϕ−→s (p) = LP−→s (p),
where LP−→s (p) = {R ∈ L : P−→s (p) ⊆ R}. 
Example 2 (Copeland rule) Let sC (a, p) denote the Copeland score of alternative a in
preference profile p which is the number of alternatives a beats in pairwise comparisons,
i.e., # {b ∈ A\ {a} : # {i ∈ N : .a.b. = p(i)} > n/2}. Consider the partial order Pc(p) =
{(a, b) : sC (a, p) > sC (b, p) or a = b}. The Copeland rule ϕC is defined for profile p by
ϕC(p) = LPc(p),
where LPc(p) = {R ∈ L : Pc(p) ⊆ R}. 
Note that by Proposition 1, score rules and the Copeland rule, as defined in the examples above,
satisfy convex valuedness.
Example 3 (Pareto rule) For each profile p, the Pareto rule ϕPar is defined ϕPar(p) =
L∩{p(i):i∈N}. 
Example 4 (k-majority rule) Let A consist of m alternatives and N be a set of n agents. Let
k be a positive integer such that m−1m n < k ≤ n. For any profile p define k-majority-relation(p) ={(x, y) ∈ A × A : there are at least k agents i such that .x.y. = p(i)} and define the k-majority
rule for a profile p by ϕk(p) = Lk−majority−relation(p). Since k is strictly larger than m−1m n, the
k-majority-relation(p) is acyclic. Indeed a cycle say (a1, a2), (a2, a3),...,(al−1, al),(al, a1) in the k-
majority-relation(p) would imply the existence of subsets S1,S2,...,Sl−1,Sl of N such that #Sj ≥ k
and Sj = {i ∈ N : .aj .aj+1. = p(i)} for j ∈ {1, ..., l} and where further al+1 is set equal to a1.
As preferences p(i) are transitive and therefore in particular acyclic it follows that ∩{Sj : j ∈
{1, ..., l}} = ∅. But as #Sj ≥ k > m−1m n ≥ l−1l n, because l ≤ m, this result would contradict
Proposition 4 (see the Appendix). Therefore Lk−majority−relation(p) is non-empty and ϕk is well-
defined. Rule ϕk is convex valued by definition and it is obvious that it is neutral, Pareto optimal
and anonymous. Note that in case k = n rule ϕk equals the Pareto rule, ϕPar. Further note that
Lk−majority−relation(p) = {R ∈ L : ∩{p(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ R for all #S ≥ k}. 
2.3 Update Monotonicity
Consider profile p and linear order R an outcome of some rule at that profile. We call profile q an
update of p towards R if p(i) ∩ R ⊆ q(i) for all agents i ∈ N . So, for all agents i this means that
R and q(i) have at least in common what p(i) and R have. Or to put it differently, for all agents i,
preference q(i) only differs from R on pairs where p(i) differs from R. Loosely speaking, this boils
down to q(i) and R having more pairs in common than p(i) and R have. Note that in that case q(i)
is between p(i) and R for all agents i. Based on this update, the following notions of monotonicity
are defined.
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(Update) Monotonicity: A rule ϕ is update monotone if for all p in LN , for all R ∈ ϕ (p), and
for all updates q of p towards R,
R ∈ ϕ(q).
Furthermore, ϕ is strongly update monotone if it is update monotone and ϕ(q) ⊆ ϕ(p) for all such
outcomes R in ϕ (p) and profiles q.
From this point, on we use the word monotonicity instead of update monotonicity whenever it
is clear that we mean the latter. Note that betweenness implies that the Kemeny distance between
the collective preference R and each individual preference is not increased from profile p to profile
q. Indeed monotonicity can be defined in a stronger way by only demanding that these distances
do not increase and therewith dropping the betweenness condition. In Section 5 this is discussed
in more detail.
Because the set of profiles is connected by elementary changes we have the following immediate
result.
Proposition 2 A rule ϕ is monotone if Lab ∩ ϕ (p) ⊆ ϕ(q) for all profiles p, q ∈ LN , such that
Lab ∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅ and there are agents j ∈ N and alternatives a, b ∈ N with p|N−{j} = q|N−{j},
.ab. = q(j), .ba. = p(j) and q(j) is an elementary change of p(j) in pair ab. Furthermore, ϕ is
strongly monotone if and only if it is monotone and ϕ(q) ⊆ ϕ(p) for such p, q and alternatives a
and b.
Remark 2 As the empty set is contained in any set, it follows immediately that ϕ is monotone
if and only if Lab ∩ ϕ (p) ⊆ ϕ(q) for all profiles p, q ∈ LN , such that there are agents j ∈ N and
alternatives a, b ∈ N with p|N−{j} = q|N−{j}, .ab. = q(j), .ba. = p(j) and q(j) is an elementary
change of p(j) in pair ab. The requirement Lab∩ϕ(p) being non-empty is important, though more for
strong monotonicity. Actually, monotonicity implies both Lab∩ϕ (p) ⊆ ϕ(q) and Lba∩ϕ (q) ⊆ ϕ(p).
If Lab ∩ ϕ(p) is non-empty, then ϕ (q) ⊆ ϕ(p). If in addition Lba ∩ ϕ (q) = ∅, a situation which
holds for the Kemeny rule, we have Lab ∩ ϕ (p) ⊆ ϕ(q), ϕ (q) ⊆ ϕ(p) and ϕ (q) ⊆ Lab. Hence, then
Lab ∩ ϕ (p) = ϕ(q). Note also that a rule ϕ is strongly monotone if for all alternative a and b and
all profiles like p and q we have Lab ∩ ϕ (p) = ϕ(q) whenever Lab ∩ ϕ(p) is non-empty. 4
3 Convex Valued Rules
As pointed out in the introduction and in the examples of the previous section, many preferences
rules, such as score rules, the Kramer rule and the Copeland rule, are convex valued. In this
section, we discuss the consequences of strong monotonicity under the assumption of convex valued
outcomes. To structure this discussion further, we only consider rules satisfying the following
basic conditions: Pareto optimality, neutrality and replication invariance. The latter condition is
a strengthening of anonymity and links different sets of agents. These five conditions together
characterize the class of super majority rules. To each profile, these rules assign all linear orders
that extend the ordered pairs for which there are at least k agents who unanimously agree upon
them. The number k is chosen in such a way that the pairs for the possibly different sets of k
agents cannot form a cyclical decision. Therefore k depends on the number of alternatives and the
number of agents.
To illustrate how convex valuedness and monotonicity under the other three conditions bring
about this characterization, consider the outcome of an arbitrary rule ϕ satisfying these conditions
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at a standard Condorcet profile p for three agents 1, 2, and 3 and three alternatives a, b, and c
defined by:
p(1) = abc
p(2) = bca
p(3) = cab.
Here preferences are denoted by their representation. So, abc denotes the linear order at which
a is the most preferred, b the second most and c is considered the worst. Assume abc ∈ ϕ (p). Then
by neutrality bca, cab ∈ ϕ (p). Now abc, bca, cab ∈ ϕ (p) and convex valuedness imply ϕ (p) = L.
Assume acb ∈ ϕ (p). Then by neutrality bac, cba ∈ ϕ (p). Now acb, bac, cba ∈ ϕ (p) and convex
valuedness again imply ϕ (p) = L. This means that such rules will assign the set of all possible
preferences to the Condorcet profile p. In particular bac ∈ ϕ(p). Next, consider the preference
profile q defined by
q(1) = abc = p(1)
q(2) = bac
q(3) = abc = p(1).
Note that q is an update of p towards both bac and abc. Because of monotonicity, ϕ therefore
assigns abc and bac to profile q, which by Pareto optimality then implies that ϕ(q) = {abc, bac}.
Note that bac is among the outcome at profile p where only one-third of the population preferences
is in line with this ranking and two-third is opposing it. Many commonly used rules, however, take
only the two third majority point of view abc at this profile q. This means that these rules do not
satisfy all five conditions. In fact they defect on monotonicity.
The question now is “how large a coalition, say S, should be” in order to ensure that ϕ only
assigns the opinion of this coalition S and therewith ignores that of the minority N − S. The
example above clarifies that in case of three alternatives S should consist of strictly more than two
third of the agents present. Indeed, this makes sense for k-majority rules, because in the three
alternatives three agents case letting k = 2 would yield a cycle since two agent coalition {1, 2} is
unanimous on bc, coalition {2, 3} on ca and coalition {1, 3} on ab. But this cycle cannot be extended
to a linear order.
Unless stated otherwise, for the remainder of this section, we switch to the stronger version of
monotonicity. This is because we were not able to determine the class of Pareto optimal, neutral,
replication invariant, convex valued and monotone rules. It is clear that this class is larger than
that of super majority rules. For instance, biased super majority rules, introduced in the discussion
section, are not strongly monotone but they are monotone.
The class of Pareto optimal, neutral, convex valued, replication invariant and strongly monotone
rules is described by some threshold function g which assigns to every number of agents n a minimal
number of agents g(n) needed to form a decisive coalition. Formally, the super majority rule ϕg is
defined for every profile p in LN by:
ϕg = Lg(#N)−majority−relation(p).
Here g is a so-called threshold function from N − {0} to N − {0} defined by the following two
conditions:
a) m−1m <
g(n)
n ≤ 1 for all n in N,
b) g(n)−1n <
g(kn)
kn ≤ g(n)n for all k and n in N.
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Clearly ϕg is well-defined as by condition a), g(#N) ≤ #N and further m−1m · #N < g(#N)
implies that Lg(#N)−majority−relation(p) is non-empty. See also Example 4 and Proposition 4. By
condition b), minimality of the threshold is carried to different numbers of agents. So, ϕg assigns to
a profile p in LN , the linear extensions of all pairs of alternatives on which at least g(#N) agents
in N unanimously agree. The fraction g(n)n can be seen as a minimal fraction for a coalition to
be decisive. That is g(k)−1k <
g(l)
l for all numbers k and l in N. Indeed by condition b) on g it
follows that g(k)−1k <
g(kl)
kl ≤ g(k)k and g(l)−1l < g(kl)kl ≤ g(l)l for all such numbers k and l. Hence,
g(k)−1
k <
g(kl)
kl ≤ g(l)l and therewith g(k)−1k < g(l)l for all numbers k and l. It is therefore tempting
to define ϕg on the basis of β = inf{ g(n)n : n ∈ N}, and assigning to a profile p in LN the convex
set Lk−majority−relation(p) for k such that k#N ≥ β. But also assigning Ll−majority−relation(p) for l
such that l#N > β would yield a rule satisfying the five conditions mentioned above. In case β is
rational these two definitions yield (slightly) different rules. Therefore to capture them both in one
formulation we chose for the description based on a function like g.
Clearly, by definition, ϕg is Pareto optimal and neutral. As L∩{p(i):i∈S} is convex by Lemma 1
and the fact that intersection of convex sets is convex, it follows that ϕg is convex valued. Next,
we argue that ϕg is replication invariant.
Lemma 1 ϕg is replication invariant.
Proof. Consider profile p in LN and its lth replication q = (p1, p2, ..., pl) in LN1∪N2∪...∪Nl for some
integer l ≥ 2. It is sufficient to prove that ϕg(p) = ϕg(q). That is g(#N)-majority-relation(p) =
g(l ·#N)-majority-relation(q). Since g(l·#N)l·#N ≤ g(#N)#N , it follows that g(#N)-majority-relation(p) ⊆
g(l ·#N)-majority-relation(q). Indeed if S = {i ∈ N : .a.b. = p(i)} for different alternatives a and
b such that #S ≥ g(#N) and therewith (a, b) ∈ g(#N)-majority-relation(p), then we may identify
S1 up to Sl in respectively N1 up to Nl such that #S = #Sj and .a.b. = q(i) for all j ∈ {1, ..., l}
and all i ∈ Sj . Therefore #{i ∈ N1 ∪ N2 ∪ ... ∪ Nl : .a.b. = q(i)} ≥ l · #S = l · g(#N) and
(a, b) ∈ g(l ·#N)-majority-relation(q). Further, because of g(#N)−1#N < g(l·#N)l·#N , g(l ·#N)-majority-
relation(q) ⊆ g(#N)-majority-relation(p). To see this let S˜ = {i ∈ N1 ∪N2 ∪ ... ∪Nl : .a.b. = q(i)}
and #S˜ ≥ l · g(#N). Because q is the lth replica of p, #Sj = 1l · #S˜, for Sj = S˜ ∩ Nj and j ∈
{1, 2, ..., l}. So, #Sj#N ≥ g(l·#N)l·#N > g(#N)−1#N and therewith #Sj > g(#N)− 1. Hence, #Sj ≥ g(#N)
which implies (a, b) ∈ g(#N)-majority-relation(p).
Lemma 2 ϕg is strongly monotone.
Proof. Consider profile p in LN and any R in ϕg(p). Consider any update q of p towards R such
that for some agent j in N we have p(i) = q(i) for all i in N − {j} and, q(j) is an elementary
change of p(j) in pair ab with .a.b. = R, .ab. = q(j) and .ba. = p(j). In view of Proposition 2 it is
sufficient to prove that R ∈ ϕg(q) and ϕg(q) ⊆ ϕg(p). Now let S ⊆ N with #S ≥ g(#N). Because
of R ∈ ϕg(p) it follows that ∩{p(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ R and as .a.b. = R we have (b, a) /∈ ∩{p(i) : i ∈ S}.
So, by the choice of q
∩{p(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ ∩{q(i) : i ∈ S} and
∩{q(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ (∩{p(i) : i ∈ S} ∪ {(a, b)}).
As .a.b. = R it follows that ∩{q(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ R. Because this holds for arbitrary S, such that
#S ≥ g(#N), we have that R ∈ ϕg(q). To prove ϕg(q) ⊆ ϕg(p) let R ∈ ϕg(q). It is sufficient to
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prove R ∈ ϕg(p). As ∩{p(i) : i ∈ S} ⊆ ∩{q(i) : i ∈ S} for all S ⊆ N , with #S ≥ g(#N), we have
by definition of ϕg that R ∈ ϕg(p).
All of the above makes it clear that the rule ϕg is Pareto optimal, neutral, convex valued,
replication invariant and strongly monotone. Next, we prove that only super majority rules satisfy
these five conditions simultaneously. In the following two lemmas we provide some insight about
coalitional power at profiles composed of two preferences which form an elementary change. Actually
these profiles resemble collective decision situations between two alternatives, the ones on which
the elementary change is based. In the following Lemmas we shall prove that on these profiles
Pareto optimal, neutral, replication invariant, convex valued and strongly monotone rules ϕ are
equal to a super majority rule ϕg for some function g. Thereafter, we show in Theorem 1 that this
result expands to all profiles hence that ϕ = ϕg. Lemma 3 and 5 are based on the weak version of
monotonicity and are also used in the following Section 4. Therefore, for now let rule ϕ be Pareto
optimal, neutral, replication invariant, convex valued and monotone.
Lemma 3 Let R be an elementary change of R in pair ab. Let S ⊆ N1 and T ⊆ N2 be coalitions
such that 12 ≤ #S#N1 ≤
#T
#N2
. Then:
(a) R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN1−S) ( S is decisive; fraction #S#N1 is decisive);
(b) ϕ(RS , R
N1−S
) = {R} implies ϕ(RT , RN2−T ) = {R} (if fraction #S#N1 is strictly decisive, then
any greater fraction #T#N2 is also strictly decisive)
(c) ϕ(RT , R
N2−T
) = {R,R} implies ϕ(RS , RN1−S) = {R,R} (if fraction #T#N2 is not strictly deci-
sive, then any smaller fraction #S#N1 larger than or equal to a half is not strictly decisive).
Proof. (a) Let 2 ·#S ≥ #N1. Let U be a coalition in N1 such that N1 − S ⊆ U and #S = #U .
Pareto optimality implies ϕ(RS , R
N1−S
) ∈ {{R}, {R}, {R,R}}. Suppose R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN1−S). It is
sufficient to prove that R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN1−S). Considering the permutation τ on A such that τ(x) = x
for all x ∈ A−{a, b}, τ(a) = b and τ(b) = a it follows that τR = R and τR = R. Now neutrality and
R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN1−S) implies R = τR ∈ ϕ(τRS , τRN1−S) = ϕ(RS , RN1−S). So, monotonicity implies
R ∈ ϕ(RN1−U , RU ). Now, anonymity which is implied by replication invariance, see Remark 1,
yields R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN1−S).
(b) Let ϕ(RS , R
N1−S
) = {R}. Consider N3 and V and W two subsets of N3 such that
#N3 = #N1 · #N2, #V = #N2 · #S and #W = #N1 · #T . Replication invariance now implies
ϕ(RV , R
N3−V
) = {R} and as #N2 · #S ≤ #N1 · #T monotonicity requires R ∈ ϕ(RW , RN3−W )
and as R /∈ ϕ(RV , RN3−V ) monotonicity and anonymity imply R /∈ ϕ(RW , RN3−W ). So,
ϕ(RW , R
N3−W
) = {R} and replication invariance implies ϕ(RT , RN2−T ) = {R}.
(c) Let ϕ(RT , R
N2−T
) = {R,R}. Then part (b) implies ϕ(RS , RN1−S) 6= {R}. Hence Pareto
optimality yields ϕ(RS , R
N1−S
) = {R} or ϕ(RS , RN1−S) = {R,R}. Because of part (a) the latter
part of this disjunction holds.
Remark 3 Note that in the previous Lemma 3 (part(a)) only anonymity, neutrality and mono-
tonicity is needed. This means that under these conditions ϕ(RS , R
N1−S
) = {R} implies #S > n2 .4
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The following Lemma generalizes the decision power of minority coalitions as discussed at the
beginning of this section.
Lemma 4 Let R be an elementary change of R in pair ab. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition such that
1
2 ≤ #S#N ≤ m−1m . Then ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) =
{
R,R
}
.
Proof. First consider the special case where #N = m and #S = m− 1. So, #S#N = m−1m . Consider
a numbering of the alternatives such that:
a1a2a3a4...atat+1...am = R˜
1 = R
a2a3a4...atat+1...ama1 = R˜
2
a3a4...atat+1...ama1a2 = R˜
3
...
ama1a2...atat+1...am−1 = R˜m.
Without loss of generality we may assume that a = at, b = at+1 and then a1a2...at−1at+1at...am =
R. Let p be the Condorcet profile defined for all agents i in N by p(i) = R˜i. Next we prove
ϕ(p) = L.
Let τ be a permutation on A such that τ(at) = at+1modm for all t in {1, ...,m}. Then τR˜i =
R˜i+1modm. Neutrality and replication invariance now imply that if R̂ ∈ ϕ(p), then τ tR̂ ∈ ϕ(p)
for all t ∈ {1, ...,m}. For a given s there is a integer u such that as.... = τuR̂. So, ∩{τ tR̂ : t ∈
{1, ...,m}} = ∅. Convex valuedness of ϕ and Proposition 1 now imply that ϕ(p) = L.
Now R = R˜1 ⊇ R˜t ∩R for all t 6= i+ 1 and R ⊇ R˜i+1 ∩ R˜1. As ϕ(p) = L, monotonicity implies
ϕ((RS , R
N−S
) ⊇ {R,R}. Pareto optimality now yields that ϕ((RS , RN−S) = {R,R}. Finally, for
any S,N such that 12 ≤ #S#N ≤ m−1m , by Lemma 3, we have ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = {R,R}.
Remark 4 Note that in the previous two Lemmas 3 and 4 only monotonicity, neutrality and
anonymity is needed and not the strong version of monotonicity. This implies that ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) ={
R,R
}
for all preferences R and R which form an elementary change and all S such that
1
m · #N ≤ #S ≤ m−1m · #N and for all rules ϕ that are Pareto optimal, neutral, anonymous,
convex valued rules and monotone. As it is easy to check that many well-known rules satisfy the
former four and do not satisfy this result on elementary changes, we may conclude that many
well-known rules are not monotone. For instance, any score rule is not monotone. Indeed, an
elementary change involving different scores implies that the absolute majorities, instead of m−1m
majorities, are decisive at such profiles. 4
Assume now, in addition, that ϕ is strongly monotone. In the sequel, we prove that ϕ is in fact
a super majority rule. For such a rule ϕ, we define two logically different sets Ball and Bsome. In
the latter we find those pairs of numbers (k, n) such that for some set of agents N, with #N = n
and some coalition S ⊆ N , with #S = k, and some pair of linear orders R and R forming a
elementary change, such that both coalitions S and N − S are decisive at profile (RS , RN−S), that
is ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = {R,R}. Hence the outcome at those profiles equals the Pareto set of the profile.
In Ball we find all pairs of numbers (k, n) for which this holds for all appropriate S, N , R and R.
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Ball =
 (k, n) : where n− k ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and ϕ(R
S , R
N−S
) = {R,R}
for all R,R forming an elementary change
and all S ⊆ N such that #S = k and #N = n }

Bsome =
 (k, n) : where n− k ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and ϕ(R
S , R
N−S
) = {R,R}
for some R,R forming an elementary change
and some S ⊆ N such that #S = k and #N = n }

The two foregoing Lemmas imply that {(k, n) : 12 ≤ kn ≤ m−1m } ⊆ Ball and logically we have Ball⊆ Bsome. We shall prove that the latter subset relation is in fact an equation. Thereafter we refer
to these sets by B.
The following Lemma shows that for all pairs of sets of agents (S,N) such that S ⊂ N and
(#S,#N) ∈ Ball and all linear orders R and R, not necessarily forming an elementary change, rule
ϕ assigns the Pareto set to profile (RS , R
N−S
).
Lemma 5 Let S ⊆ N be such that (#S,#N) ∈ Ball. Let R and R be two linear orders. Then
ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = LR∩R.
Proof. By induction on δ(R,R).
Basis If δ(R,R) = 0, then it follows by Pareto optimality. Let δ(R,R) = 1. As (#S,#N) ∈ Ball
it follows by definition that ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = {R,R} = LR∩R.
Induction Step Let δ(R,R) = t ≥ 2. Pareto optimality implies that ϕ(RS , RN−S) ⊆ LR∩R.
Let R˜ ∈ LR∩R − {R,R}. It follows that δ(R, R˜) < t and δ(R, R˜) < t. So, by induction LR∩R˜ =
ϕ(RS , R˜N−S) and LR∩R˜ = ϕ(R˜
S , R
N−S
). If R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), then by strong monotonicity
R˜ ∈ LR∩R˜ = ϕ(RS , R˜N−S) ⊆ ϕ(RS , R
N−S
). If R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), then by strong monotonicity
R˜ ∈ LR∩R˜ = ϕ(R˜S , R
N−S
) ⊆ ϕ(RS , RN−S). If R˜ ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), then by strong monotonicity
R ∈ LR∩R˜ = ϕ(RS , R˜N−S) ⊆ ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) and R ∈ LR∩R˜ = ϕ(R˜S , R
N−S
) ⊆ ϕ(RS , RN−S).This
then yields by convexity that LR∩R ⊆ ϕ(RS , R
N−S
). Hence if R˜ ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), then LR∩R =
ϕ(RS , R
N−S
). Since R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), R˜ ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S), or R˜ ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S) for some R˜ ∈
LR∩R − {R,R}, the above yields that ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = LR∩R.
Next lemma is about profiles polarized in elementary changes. We show that whenever some
coalition of size k is not powerful enough to impose its preference uniquely at some profile of
elementary changes, then any coalition of the same size is also not powerful enough to impose its
preference uniquely at any profile of elementary changes. Since Ball ⊆ Bsome, this boils down to
say that Ball = Bsome.
Lemma 6 Let S be a subset of N such that (#S,#N) ∈ Bsome. Then (#S,#N) ∈ Ball.
Proof. Let (#S,#N) ∈ Bsome such that #N − #S ≤ #S ≤ #N − 1. Let R be an elementary
change of R in pair ab at position l, such that ϕ(RS , R
N−S
) = {R,R}. It is sufficient to prove
that (#S,#N) ∈ Ball. If #S#N ≤ m−1m , then this holds by Lemma 4. Therefore we may assume that
#S
#N >
m−1
m . So, there are T ⊆ S be such that #N − #T ≤ #T ≤ m−1m · #N and by Lemma 4
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(#T,#N) ∈ Ball. Note that, by neutrality, ϕ(RSl , R
N−S
l ) = {Rl, Rl} for all elementary changes in
position l. First we will show that this also extends to all elementary changes in position l + 1.
Let .abc. = R and .bac. = R. Consider .abc. = R = R1, .acb. = R2, .cab. = R3, .cba. = R4,
.bca. = R5 and .bac. = R6 = R. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ(R
S
1 , R
N−S
2 ) = {R1, R2} since R1
and R2 form an elementary change in position l + 1.
Since (#T,#N) ∈ Ball, by Lemma 5, ϕ(RN−T5 , RT2 ) = {R1, R2, ..., R6}. From this,
monotonicity implies that {R1, R2} ⊆ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ). Since R1 ∈ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ),
by strong monotonicity we have that ϕ(RN−S6 , R
S
1 ) ⊆ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ). By assump-
tion ϕ(RN−S6 , R
S
1 ) = {R6, R1}, and therewith {R1, R2, R6} ⊆ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ). So,
by Pareto optimality {R1, R2, R6} = ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ). Since (#T,#N) ∈ Ball, by
Lemma 5 we have that ϕ(RN−T6 , R
T
3 ) = {R1, R2, ..., R6}. So, by monotonicity we have
that {R1, R2, R3} ⊆ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT3 ). As R2 ∈ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT3 ), strong monotonic-
ity implies ϕ(RN−S6 , R
S−T
1 , R
T
3 ) ⊇ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT2 ) = {R1, R2, R6}. Hence, we have that
{R1, R2, R3, R6} ⊆ ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT3 ) and convex valuedness now implies ϕ(RN−S6 , RS−T1 , RT3 ) =
{R1, R2, ..., R6}. By employing the permutation τ on A such that τ(x) = x for all x ∈ A−{a, b, c},
τ(a) = b, τ(b) = c and τ(c) = a neutrality yields ϕ(RN−S4 , R
S−T
5 , R
T
1 ) = {R1, R2, ..., R6}. Mono-
tonicity and Pareto optimality finally yields that ϕ(RS1 , R
N−S
2 ) = {R1, R2}. Then, by neutrality, for
all elementary changes (RSl+1, R
N−S
l+1 ) in position l+1, we have that ϕ(R
S
l+1, R
N−S
l+1 ) = {Rl+1, Rl+1}.
By a similar approach it can be shown that for elementary changes R′ and R
′
in position l − 1
we have ϕ(R′S , R
′N−S
) = {R′, R′}. Therefore we may conclude that (#S,#N) ∈ Ball.
Remark 5 Now let B = Ball = Bsome. Consider the function f from N − {0} to N − {0} for an
arbitrary number n by f(n) = min{#S : S ⊆ N, with #N = n, and (#S,#N) /∈ B}. By definition
and as {(k, n) : 12 ≤ kn ≤ m−1m } ⊆ Ball = B, it follows that m−1m < f(n)n ≤ 1 for all n in N (first
condition of the threshold function). By definition of f and since ϕ is replication invariant it follows
that k · (f(n) − 1) < f(kn) ≤ k · f(n). Therefore it follows that f(n)−1n < f(kn)kn ≤ f(n)n (second
condition of the threshold function). Hence f is indeed a threshold function. 4
The following Theorem shows that ϕ equals super majority rule ϕg.
Theorem 1 A rule ϕ is Pareto optimal, neutral, replication invariant, convex valued and strongly
monotone if and only if ϕ = ϕg for some threshold function g.
Proof. (If part) Follows from the definition of ϕg and Lemmas 1 and 2.
(Only if-part) Let ϕ be Pareto optimal, neutral, replication invariant, convex valued and strongly
monotone. By Lemmas above and Remark 5, we may find such a threshold function g such that
for all elementary changes R and R and all coalitions T ⊆ N we have that ϕg(RT , RN−T ) =
ϕ(RT , R
N−T
). Let p be any profile in LN , it remains to prove that ϕ(p) = ϕg(p).
To show ϕ(p) ⊆ ϕg(p), let S ⊆ N be any coalition such that #S ≥ g(#N) and .a.b. = p(i)
for some alternatives a and b and for all i in S. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ(p) ⊆ Lab. To the
contrary let R̂ ∈ ϕ(p)− Lab ⊆ Lba. We distinguish two cases.
Case (a and b are consecutive in R̂): Let .ba. = R̂. Then order R′ in Lab being the elementary
change of R̂ in ba, is between R̂ and p(i) for all i ∈ S. Hence, monotonicity would yield that R̂ ∈
ϕ((R′)S , R̂N−S). So, ϕ((R′)S , R̂N−S) 6= ϕg((R′)S , R̂N−S) = {R′} which cannot be as R′ and R̂
form an elementary change in ba.
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Case (a and b are not consecutive in R̂): Let c1, c2...cl be alternatives different from a and b
such that .bc1c2...cla. = R̂. We may take R̂ such that l is minimal. For t ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} let R̂t be the
linear order defined by R̂t|A−{ct} = R̂|A−{ct} and .ctb.a. = R̂t. Furthermore, let R̂0 be the linear
order defined by R̂0|A−{cl} = R̂|A−{cl} and .bc1c2...cl−1acl. = R̂0.Take any i ∈ S and hence p(i)
in Lab. We prove that for each p (i), there is a t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., l} such that R̂t is between p(i) and
R̂. Take s such that (cs, cu) ∈ p(i) for all u ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. Note that we either have .cs.a. = p(i) or
.a.cs. = p(i). Assume .cs.a. = p(i). Hence, .cs.a.b. = p(i). To prove that R̂
s is between p(i) and
R̂ let (x, y) ∈ R̂s − R̂. It is sufficient to show that (x, y) ∈ p(i). By construction of R̂s and R̂, we
have that x = cs and either y = b or y = cu for some 0 < u < s. Because of .cs.a.b. = p(i) and
(cs, cu) ∈ p(i) for all u ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}, and by the choice of s,we have that (x, y) ∈ p(i). Hence for the
case .cs.a. = p(i), we have that R̂
t is between p(i) and R̂ for t = s. Now assume .a.cs. = p(i). So,
by construction .a.ct. = p(i) for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. Then R̂0 ⊆ R̂ ∪ {(a, cl)} ⊆ R̂ ∪ p(i). Therefore,
R̂0 is between R̂ and p(i). Hence for the case .a.cs. = p(i), R̂
t is between p(i) and R̂ for t = 0.
Therefore we may take si ∈ {0, 1, ..., l} such that R̂si is between p(i) and R̂ for all i ∈ S.
Next take St = {i ∈ S : t = si}, i.e., the set of individuals i ∈ S which share R̂t as the preference
between R̂ and their preference p (i). Let Sv be such that #Sv ≥ #St for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., l}. By the
assumption on the minimality of l, we have that R̂v /∈ ϕ(p) and as R̂v is between R̂ and p(i) for all
i ∈ Sv it follows by strong monotonicity that R̂v /∈ ϕ(( R̂v)Sv , R̂N−Sv ). But by construction of Sv
we have that #Sv ≥ 1l+1 · m−1m ·#N ≥ 1m−1 · m−1m ·#N ≥ #Nm . Therefore, #(N −Sv) ≤ m−1m ·#N .
So, as {(k, n) : 12 ≤ kn ≤ m−1m } ⊆ B it follows that #(N − Sv) < g(#N) and therewith that the
contradiction R̂v ∈ ϕ(( R̂v)Sv , R̂N−Sv ).
To show ϕ(p) ⊇ ϕg(p), let R ∈ ϕg(p) and suppose to the contrary that R /∈ ϕ(p). As by the
previous part ϕ(p) ⊆ ϕg(p) and convex valuedness we may assume that there exist R ∈ ϕ(p) ⊆ ϕg(p)
such that R and R form an elementary change in ab. Furthermore, without loss of generality, let
.ab. = R and .ba. = R and let S = {i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ Lab}. Strong monotonicity now implies that
R,R ∈ ϕg(RS , RN−S) ⊆ ϕg(p) and R ∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S) ⊆ ϕ(p) and R /∈ ϕ(RS , RN−S). This however
contradicts ϕg(R
T , R
N−T
) = ϕ(RT , R
N−T
) for all coalitions T ⊆ N. This contradiction completes
the proof.
4 Dropping Convex Valuedness
Although super majority rules satisfy several nice conditions, they are not extremely resolute in
the sense that they often assign a lot of outcomes to profiles due to lack of coalitional power.
This is essentially caused by the lower bound n · m−1m for k, a lower bound which is needed in
order to avoid cyclical decisions. The discussion at the beginning of the previous section involving
the Condorcet profile on three alternatives makes clear that an increase on the resolution of rules
can most likely be achieved by dropping the convex valuedness condition. In general, we did not
succeed in describing the class of all Pareto optimal, neutral, replication invariant and monotone
rules. Therefore we fixed our attention to the well-known Kemeny rule belonging to this class.
It can be seen as a natural application of the Kemeny distance, introduced by Kemeny and Snell
(1962), to social choice theory. This rule assigns those ranking(s) to a profile which minimizes the
sum of distances to each of the individual preference in that profile.
Definition 1 Given a profile p ∈ LN , a preference relation R is a Kemeny ranking for p, if for all
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R′ ∈ L, we have: ∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i)) ≤
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, p(i)).
A rule which assigns all Kemeny rankings to each profile is called the Kemeny rule.
Definition 2 Kemeny rule, denoted by ϕKemeny, assigns to a profile p ∈ LN :
ϕKemeny (p) = {R ∈ L : R is a Kemeny ranking for p} .
We characterize the Kemeny rule by Pareto optimality, neutrality, pairwiseness, consistency and
monotonicity. For that we first prove that the Kemeny rule satisfies these conditions.
Lemma 7 ϕKemeny is Pareto optimal, neutral, pairwise, and consistent.
To show Pareto optimality, take any profile p ∈ LN such that for some a, b ∈ A and for all
i ∈ N , p (i) = .a.b.. Consider the permutation σab on A such that σab (a) = b, σab (b) = a, and
σab (c) = c for all c ∈ A−{a, b}. Then by Proposition 5 in the appendix, for any i ∈ N and for any
linear order Rab ∈ Lab and Rba = σabRab, we have that:
δ(p (i) , Rab) < δ(p (i) , Rba).
Hence, ∑
i∈N
δ(p (i) , Rab) <
∑
i∈N
δ(p (i) , Rba).
Therefore, ϕKemeny (p) ∩ Lba = ∅ which implies ϕKemeny (p) ⊆ Lab and therewith it is Pareto
optimal. It satisfies neutrality by definition and pairwiseness because M(p) = M(q) implies∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i)) =
∑
(a,b)∈A×A
∑
i∈N
(a, b) ∈ p(i)−R
=
∑
(a,b)∈A×A−R
∑
i∈N
(a, b) ∈ p(i)
=
∑
(a,b)∈A×A−R
M(p)(a,b)
=
∑
(a,b)∈A×A−R
M(q)(a,b)
=
∑
i∈N
δ(R, q(i)).
Hence, in that case
∑
i∈N δ(R, p(i)) =
∑
i∈N δ(R, q(i)) for all profiles p and q and for all linear
orders R ∈ L. Consistency follows because for R ∈ L and profiles p ∈ LN1 and q ∈ LN2 , where N1
and N2 are two disjoint finite and non-empty sets of agents,
δ(R, (p, q)) = δ(R, p) + δ(R, q).
The following lemma shows that the Kemeny rule is (strongly) monotone.
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Lemma 8 ϕKemeny is strongly monotone.
Proof. Consider profile p in LN , and any R ∈ ϕKemeny(p). In the view of Proposition 2 we can
consider any update q of p towards R such that p(i) = q(i) for all i in N − {j} and for some agent
j in N , q(j) is an elementary change of p(j) in pair ab with .a.b. = R, .ab. = q(j) and .ba. = p(j).
It is sufficient to prove that R ∈ ϕKemeny(q) and ϕKemeny (q) ⊆ ϕKemeny (p). First we prove
R ∈ ϕKemeny(q). To the contrary suppose there exist R′ ∈ L such that∑
i∈N
δ(R, q(i)) >
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, q(i)).
Hence, ∑
i∈N
δ(R, q(i)) ≥
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, q(i)) + 1.
Since R is a Kemeny ranking for p, we have R ∈ ϕKemeny(p) therefore,∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i)) ≤
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, p(i)).
But then we have
δ(R′, p(j)) +
∑
i∈N−{j}
δ(R′, p(i)) =
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, p(i))
≥
∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i))
= δ(R, p(j)) +
∑
i∈N−{j}
δ(R, p(i))
= δ(R, q(j)) + 1 +
∑
i∈N−{j}
δ(R, q(i))
=
∑
i∈N
δ(R, q(i)) + 1
≥
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, q(i)) + 2
= δ(R′, q(j)) +
∑
i∈N−{j}
δ(R′, q(i)) + 2
= δ(R′, q(j)) +
∑
i∈N−{j}
δ(R′, p(i)) + 2.
Hence,
δ(R′, p(j)) ≥ δ(R′, q(j)) + 2
= δ(R′, q(j)) + δ(q(j), p(j)) + 1,
which, by the triangle inequality yields the contradiction
δ(R′, p(j)) ≥ δ(R′, p(j)) + 1.
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This completes the proof of R ∈ ϕKemeny(q). Next we show ϕKemeny (q) ⊆ ϕKemeny (p). To
the contrary, suppose there exist R′ ∈ ϕKemeny(q) − ϕKemeny(p). Since R ∈ ϕKemeny(p) and
R′ /∈ ϕKemeny(p) we have ∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i)) + 1 ≤
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, p(i)). (1)
Now R ∈ ϕKemeny(q) and R′ ∈ ϕKemeny(q) imply∑
i∈N
δ(R, q(i)) =
∑
i∈N
δ(R′, q(i)).
Hence,
δ(R, q(j)) +
∑
i∈N
i6=j
δ(R, p(i)) = δ(R′, q(j)) +
∑
i∈N
i6=j
δ(R′, p(i)).
So,
δ(R, p(j))− 1 +
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
δ(R, p(i)) = δ(R′, q(j)) +
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
δ(R′, p(i)).
That is ∑
i∈N
δ(R, p(i))− 1 =
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
δ(R′, p(i)) + δ(R′, q(j)).
Using inequality (1) this yields∑
i∈N
δ(R′, p(i))− 2 ≥
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
δ(R′, p(i)) + δ(R′, q(j)).
Hence,
δ(R′, p(j))− 2 ≥ δ(R′, q(j)).
So,
δ(R′, p(j)) > δ(R′, q(j)) + 1
= δ(R′, q(j)) + δ(p(j), q(j))
≥ δ(R′, p(j)).
This contradiction ends the proof
In order to prove that Kemeny rule is the only rule satisfying these five conditions simultaneously,
let ϕ be a rule that is Pareto optimal, neutral, pairwise, consistent, and monotone. The following
five Lemma’s prepare the proof of this characterization.
First, we prove that equality holds between ϕ and ϕkemeny for maximal conflicts. These are
profiles p at which two equal groups of agents have totally opposing preferences over all pairs of
alternatives. So, there are 2k agents and a preference R in L such that k agents have preference
p(i) = R and the remaining k agents have preference p(i) = −R, where −R = {(b, a) : (a, b) ∈ R}.
Lemma 9 Let p be a maximal conflict. Then ϕ(p) = L = ϕKemeny(p).
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that ϕKemeny = L. For alternatives a and b consider the
permutation σab on A such that σab(a) = b, σab(b) = a and σab(c) = c for all c ∈ A − {a, b}.
Neutrality and pairwiseness imply that σab ◦ ϕ(p) = ϕ(σabp) = ϕ(p). This means that ϕ(p) is
closed under any permutation of A which implies that ϕ(p) = L.
Next, we prove that the equality of ϕ and ϕKemeny extends to almost maximal conflicts. These
are profiles p at which equal groups of agents have totally opposing preferences over all but one pair
of alternatives. So, there are 2k agents, two alternatives a and b and a preference R in L such that
ab... = R, meaning that a is best and b is second best at R, k agents have preference p(i) = R and
the remaining k agents have preference p(i) = σab(−R). Let us denote these profiles by pi(k, ab).
Lemma 10 Let p be an almost maximal conflict, say p = pi(k, ab). Then ϕ(p) = Lab = ϕKemeny(p).
Proof. It is straightforward to show that Lab = ϕKemeny(p). Pareto optimality implies that
ϕ(p) ⊆ Lab. In order to prove the reverse inclusion consider R in Lab. Let q be the maximal conflict
on the same set of 2k agents such that the agents at p, which have preference R, have preference
R at q and those having preference σab(−R) at p have preference −R at q. Monotonicity and
Lemma 9 imply that R is in ϕ(p). As R is arbitrarily chosen in Lab, it follows that Lab ⊆ ϕ(p). So,
Lab = ϕ(p).
In the following lemma we show that ϕ and ϕKemeny are strongly pairwise, i.e., the outcome
only depends on the net pairwise comparisons of alternatives. For an arbitrary profile p let D(p)
denote the m×m difference matrix defined for every cell (a, b) by
D(p)ab = max{0,M(p)ab −M(p)ba}.
It is easy to see that for any profile p we have ϕKemeny(p) = {R : λ(p,R) ≤ λ(p,R′) for all R′ ∈
L} where λ(p,R) = ∑ab/∈RD(p)ab. Indeed for all linear orders R ∈ L, δ(p,R) = ∑ab/∈RM(p)ab =∑
ab/∈RD(p)ab + min{M(p)ab,M(p)ba} =
∑
ab/∈RD(p)ab +
∑
ab/∈R min{M(p)ab,M(p)ba}, where the
former term equals λ(p,R) and the latter term is constant.
Consider two profiles p in LN and p′ in LN ′ such that #N = #N ′, N and N ′ are disjoint and
for all i ∈ N there is a unique i′ ∈ N ′ such that p(i) = p′(i′). Since M(p) = M(p′) it follows that
ϕ(p) = ϕ(p′). So, consistency implies that ϕ(p) = ϕ(p′) = ϕ(p, p′). Therefore with a little abuse of
notation we will write profile (p, p) instead of (p, p′).
Lemma 11 Let p and q be profiles such that D(p) = kD(q) for some integer k ≥ 1. Then ϕ(p) =
ϕ(q) and ϕKemeny(p) = ϕKemeny(q).
Proof. We only prove ϕ(p) = ϕ(q). The proof of the second equation follows similarly from
the properties: Pareto optimality, neutrality, consistency, monotonicity, and pairwiseness. Joining
almost maximal conflict profiles for each pair (a, b) with D (p)ab > 0 and possibly adding maximal
conflicts yields a profile r such that M(r) = 2M(p) + 2sÊ = 2kM(q) + 2tÊ for some positive
integers s and t, where Ê is the m ×m matrix with all cells equal to one except Êaa = 0 for all
a4. Replicating p once and q for 2k times yields profiles p′ = (p, p) and q′ = (q, q, ..., q) such that
M(r) = M(p′) + 2sÊ and M(r) = M(q′) + 2tÊ. Note that maximal conflicts have the pairwise
matrix equal to an even multiple of Ê. Therefore pairwiseness, consistency and Lemma 9 imply that
4Note that Ê can be considered as the pairwise matrix of any maximal conflict. Furthermore, for each unit
of D (p)ab, one almost maximal conflict, pi (1, ab) is added to build r. As M (pi (1, ab))ab = 2 we have M(r) =
2M(p) + 2sÊ.
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ϕ(p′) = ϕ(r) and ϕ(q′) = ϕ(r). Furthermore consistency implies ϕ(p′) = ϕ(p) and ϕ(q′) = ϕ(q).
So, the desired result ϕ(p) = ϕ(q) follows.
Remark 6 Note that Lemmas 9 and 10 follow immediately from the Condorcet condition as stated
in Young and Levenglick (1978). This condition in our notation means that for all profiles p and
for all alternatives a such that D(p)ax ≥ 0 for all alternatives x different from a (hence alternative
a is a weak Condorcet-winner at p):
1. If D(p)ay = 0 for some alternative y different from a, then R ∈ ϕ(p) ⇔ R′ ∈ ϕ(p) for all R
and R′ in L forming an elementary change in ay.
2. If D(p)ay > 0 for some alternative y different from a, then R /∈ ϕ(p) for R ∈ L with .ya. = R.
Although under different assumptions, Lemma 11 is also deduced as an intermediate result in
Young and Levenglick (1978, Lemma 1). 4
The following step is to prove that ϕ and ϕKemeny coincide on profiles where the pairwise
majority relation is non cyclic. Roughly speaking, this boils down to proving that ϕ is Condorcet
like.
Lemma 12 Let p be a profile in LN and a1, a2,..., am a numbering of the alternatives such that
for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m
M(p)aiaj ≥M(p)ajai .
Then ϕKemeny(p) = ∩{Laiaj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m such that M(p)aiaj > M(p)ajai} = ϕ(p).
Proof. Note that the intersection at the right hand side is not empty so the right equality follows
because of Lemma 10, Lemma 11 and consistency. Now ϕKemeny is consistent. This and Lemma
10 and Lemma 11 yields the left equality.
Lemma 13 ϕ is strongly monotone. Moreover, for all non-empty finite subsets N of N , all agents
i in N , all alternatives a and b in A and all profiles p and q in LN , such that Lab∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅,
(b, a) ∈ p(i), (a, b) ∈ q(i), δ(p(i), q(i)) = 1 and p|N−{i} = q|N−{i},
ϕ(q) = Lab ∩ ϕ(p).
Proof. Let N , i, a, b, p and q as in the formulation of the Lemma. Without loss of generalization
suppose that {1, 2} ∩ N = ∅. Consider r ∈ L{1,2} such that r = pi(1, ab). Lemma 10 yields that
ϕ(r) = Lab. Also we have D(q) = D(p, r). So, as Lab∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅ Lemma 11 and consistency imply
ϕ(q) = ϕ(p, r) = ϕ(r) ∩ ϕ(p) = Lab ∩ ϕ(p).
Now we are able to prove the characterization of Kemeny rule.
Theorem 2 The Kemeny rule is the only correspondence which is simultaneously Pareto optimal,
neutral, pairwise, consistent and monotone.
Proof. (If part) Lemma 7 and 8 show that the Kemeny rule satisfies these five conditions.
(Only if part) Let ϕ be a Pareto optimal, neutral, pairwise, consistent and monotone rule. Let
p be a profile. For λ(p,R) =
∑
ab/∈RD(p)ab, let λ(p,L) = min{λ(p,R) : R ∈ L}. In the sequel we
will prove by induction on λ(p,L) that ϕ(p) = ϕKemeny(p). In view of Lemma 11 we may assume
that p consists of almost maximal conflicts only.
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(Induction basis) Let λ(p,L) = 0. In that case there exist linear orders R such that D(p)ab = 0
for all ab /∈ R. So there are no pairwise majority cycles at p. Hence, by Lemma 12 ϕ(p) =
ϕKemeny(p).
(Induction step) Let λ(p,L) = k+ 1. Define the set of unanimous pairs at p by U(p) = {(x, y) ∈
A×A : .x.y. = p(i) for all agents i ∈ N}.
Claim Let (a, b) /∈ U(p) and Lab ∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅ and Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p) 6= ∅. Then Lab ∩ ϕ(p) =
Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p).
Proof of the claim Let RK ∈ Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p) and R ∈ Lab ∩ ϕ(p). Then it follows by the
definition of ϕKemeny that λ(p,R
K) = k + 1. As p consists of almost maximal conflicts we may
assume that there exists an update say q of p towards R and RK such that:
q(i) = (p(i)− {(b, a)}) ∪ {(a, b)} for some i ∈ N
q(j) = p(j) for all j ∈ N − {i}.
Lemma 13 implies that Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p) = ϕKemeny(q) and Lab ∩ ϕ(p) = ϕ(q). As λ(q,RK) = k,
the induction hypothesis implies ϕKemeny(q) = ϕ(q). Hence, Lab ∩ ϕ(p) = Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p).
End of proof of claim
Next we distinguish two cases:
Case: #ϕ(p) ≥ 2 and #ϕKemeny(p) ≥ 2. Since #ϕ(p) ≥ 2 there are alternatives a and b such
that (a, b) /∈ U(p) and Lab ∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅, Lba ∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅ and Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p) 6= ∅. Hence, by the
previous claim Lab ∩ ϕ(p) = Lab ∩ ϕKemeny(p). In case Lba ∩ ϕKemeny(p) 6= ∅ the previous claim
implies that also Lba∩ϕ(p) = Lba∩ϕKemeny(p). So, then ϕ(p) = ϕKemeny(p). If Lba∩ϕKemeny(p) =
∅, then ϕKemeny(p) ⊆ ϕ(p). So, #ϕ(p) ≥ 2 implies ϕKemeny(p) ⊆ ϕ(p). Similarly #ϕKemeny(p) ≥ 2
implies ϕKemeny(p) ⊇ ϕ(p). Hence, in this case ϕKemeny(p) = ϕ(p).
Case: There is a renaming ϕ1 and ϕ2 of ϕ and ϕKemeny and there are linear orders R
1and R2
such that ϕ1(p) = {R1} and R2 ∈ ϕ2(p). Note that we are done if ϕ2(p) = {R1}. So, therefore to
the contrary suppose that R2 6= R1. We end the proof by showing that this assumption leads to a
contradiction.
Pareto optimality implies that U(p) ⊆ R1∩R2. Next we prove that R1∩R2 ⊆ U(p). Suppose to
the contrary that (R1∩R2)−U(p) 6= ∅ that is for some pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ (R1∩R2)−U(p).
Then, by the previous claim, it follows that Lab ∩ ϕ1(p) = Lab ∩ ϕ2(p). Since (a, b) ∈ R2 and
(a, b) ∈ R1, we have that R2 ∈ Lab∩ϕ2(p) = Lab∩ϕ1(p) = {R1}. This would yield the contradiction
R2 = R1. Therefore, we may assume that (R1 ∩ R2) − U(p) = ∅ and as R1 ∩ R2 ⊆ U(p) we have
(R1 ∩R2) = U(p).
For numbers i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2} and different alternatives x and y we call the
ordered pair (x, y) “free” at Ri if .xy. = Ri and .y.x. = Rj . So, x and y are consecutively ordered
x above y at Ri and reversely ordered y above x at Rj . Therefore the pair (x, y) is in U(p).
Furthermore, let Nxy = {i ∈ N : .x.y. = p(i)} and let nxy = #Nxy. Because of R1 6= R2 we may
choose alternatives a and b such that (a, b) is free at R1 and for all (x, y) free at R1, we either have
x = a or .a.x. = R1. That is (a, b) is the highest ordered free pair in R1. As (a, b) is free at R1, we
have .b.a. = R2. Since .b.a. = R2 and .a.b. = R1, we may take (y, x) free in R2, such that b = y
or .b.y. = R2, x = a or .x.a. = R2 and for all free (c, d) in R2 if d 6= x, then either .d.x. = R2 or
.a.d. = R2. So, (y, x) is the lowest free pair in R2 just above a in R2. Where we may find this pair
ordered between b and a in R2.
Now if y = a or .y.a.b. = R1, then there is a free pair between x and y in R1 and as .x.y. = R1
this violates the assumption that (a, b) is the highest ordered free pair at R1. So, b = y or .b.y. = R1,
that is b is weakly preferred to y at R1. If x = b or .ab.x. = R1, then there is a free pair between
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x and a at R2 contradicting that (y, x) is the lowest free pair in Rj just before a in Rj . Therefore
x = a or .x.ab. = R1, which means that x is weakly preferred to a at R1. Therefore at R1, we
have: x is weakly preferred to a, and a strictly to b, and b weakly to y, whereas, by the choice of
(y, x), at R2, we have: b is weakly preferred to y, and y strictly to x, and x weakly to a. Now
since U(p) = (R1 ∩R2), we have either b = y or Nby = N and either x = a or Nxa = N. Therefore
Nab ⊆ Nay ⊆ Nxy and Nyx ⊆ Nbx ⊆ Nba. Consider R1ba = (R1 − {(a, b)}) ∪ {(b, a)} and profile q
such that q(i) = R1 if i ∈ Nab and q(i) = R1ba if i ∈ Nba. Now strong monotonicity which follows
from Lemma 13, the fact that q(i) is between p(i) and R1 for all i ∈ N and ϕ1(p) = {R1} yield that
ϕ1(q) = {R1}. Hence, by Remark 3, it follows that nab > nba. Similarly by considering a preference
R2xy = (R
2 − {(y, x)}) ∪ {(x, y)} it follows that nyx ≥ nxy. But then Nab ⊆ Nay ⊆ Nxy, nyx ≥ nxy
and Nyx ⊆ Nbx ⊆ Nba imply nab ≤ nay ≤ nxy ≤ nyx ≤ nbx ≤ nba. Hence, we have the contradiction
nab ≤ nba, which ends the proof.
5 Discussion and Further Research
Update monotonicity, as also discussed in the introduction, is essentially a monotonicity condition
for rules. We investigated preference correspondences and their reaction to an increase in support
for a collective preference. Roughly speaking, we have analyzed monotone rules both in case the
rules are convex valued and in case they are not. In the former, our finding is a class of rules that
do not involve well-known convex valued rules such as scoring rules. In the latter, we end up with
a new characterization of the Kemeny rule based on this monotonicity condition.
In following subsection we show, respectively, the independence of our conditions, some logical
relations with the conditions in Young & Levenglick characterization, some possible variations of
update monotonicity and finally, we consider this condition in relation with single valuedness.
5.1 Independence of Characterizing Conditions
Below we provide some rules showing the independence of the characterizing conditions of Theorem
1 and 2.
Super majority rule (ϕg): Defined in Section 3.
As shown in Theorem 1, ϕg is Pareto optimal, neutral, convex valued, replication invariant, and
strongly monotone. Rule ϕg is pairwise because the k-majority-relation, on which it is solely based,
is pairwise. To see that ϕg is not consistent consider A = {a, b, c}, p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = q(5) = abc
and p(4) = p(6) = cba. Then ϕg(p) = {abc} and ϕg(q) = L in case g(4) = 3. But ϕg(p, q) = L
6= ϕg(p) ∩ ϕg(q).
Biased super majority rule (ϕ̂g) Define the rule ϕ̂g for an arbitrary profile p as follows:
ϕ̂g(p) = {R,R} whenever p = (RS , R
N−S
) for some non-empty and finite subsets S,N of N such
that S  N and R and R are in L forming an elementary change. In all other cases ϕ̂g(p) = ϕg(p).
Clearly, ϕ̂g is Pareto optimal, neutral, convex valued, replication invariant and monotone. It
is not consistent because ϕg is not consistent. Consider profiles q = (R
T
1 , R
N−T
2 ) for arbitrary
preferences R1 and R2, such that #T ≥ g(#N). It follows that ϕ̂g is not strongly monotone,
because for an elementary change R1 between R1 and R2, we have ϕ̂g(R
T
1 , R
N−T
1 ) = {R1, R1}
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" ϕ̂g(RT1 , R
N−T
2 ) = {R1}. This rule shows that the stronger monotonicity condition in Theorem 1
is logically essential.
Kemeny rule (ϕKemeny): Defined in Section 4.
As discussed in Section 4, ϕKemeny is Pareto optimal, neutral, pairwise, consistent and strongly
monotone. By Remark 1, it is also replication invariant. The Kemeny rule, however, is not convex
valued, e.g., for a Condorcet profile, it assigns the profile itself as Kemeny rankings.
Selective Kemeny rule (ψKemeny): A rule ϕ is called a selective Kemeny rule whenever
for some enumeration of all linear orders, for instance L = {R1, R2, . . . , Rm!}, ψKemeny (p) =
{Ri : i is minimal for all Ri in ϕKemeny (p)},
i.e., ψKemeny assigns to each profile the Kemeny ranking with the minimal predefined index.
Note that, since for any profile p, ψKemeny (p) ⊆ ϕKemeny (p), selective Kemeny rule also satisfies
Pareto optimality. It is also pairwise since for two profiles, say p and q, with identical pairwise
matrices, ϕKemeny (p) = ϕKemeny (q) therefore Ri ∈ ϕKemeny (p) with minimal i is the same as
Ri ∈ ϕKemeny (q) with minimal i. To show that the rule is consistent let p, q be two profiles such that
ψKemeny (p) ∩ ψKemeny (q) = {Rj} . Then j is the smallest number among Ri in both ϕKemeny (p)
and ϕKemeny (q) . Hence, by consistency, Rj is in ϕKemeny(p, q) and Rj has the smallest index
among those Ri which are in ϕKemeny(p)∩ϕKemeny(q) = ϕKemeny(p, q). So, ψKemeny(p, q) = {Rj}.
Monotonicity is straightforward by strong monotonicity of Kemeny rule. It is also trivially convex
valued as it always assigns a single outcome to each profile, yet it is not neutral by construction.
Trivial rule (ϕT ): A rule ϕ is called the trivial rule if for all profiles p in LN , ϕ (p) = L.
By construction, the trivial rule always assign the same set of linear orders, L, therefore it is
neutral, pairwise, convex valued, consistent, replication invariant, and monotone. Obviously it is
not Pareto optimal.
Dictatorial rule (ϕdictatorial): A rule ϕ is called a dictatorial rule if there exists an individual
d ∈ N such that for all profiles p, ϕ (p) = {p (d)}.
Dictatorial rule ϕdictatorial is known to be Pareto optimal. To show consistency, for any pre-
defined order over individuals in N , to choose the dictator for each subset of individuals N ⊆ N ,
consider two profiles and two dictators in each society. If two profiles agree on an outcome, when
the two profiles merge, one dictator will remain as the dictator, according to the predefined order,
of the merged profile hence the outcome will be the same. It is also trivially convex valued as it
always assigns a single outcome to each profile. It is neutral and monotone by construction. It is
not anonymous; hence, it also fails to be pairwise and replication invariant.
Borda rule (ϕBorda): Defined in Example 1 of Section 2, where the score vector
−→s = (m,m −
1,m− 2, ..., 1).
Borda is known to be Pareto optimal, neutral, pairwise and consistent and therewith replication
invariant. By construction it is convex valued like all score rules. It fails to be monotone; hence, it
is also not strongly monotone.
The table below summarizes the findings discussed above. It shows the logical independence of
the characterizing conditions in both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We denote ϕKemeny and ψKemeny,
by ϕK and ψK respectively.
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ϕg ϕK ψK ϕT ϕdictatorial ϕBorda ϕ̂g
Pareto optimal Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Neutral Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Consistent N Y Y Y Y Y N
Convex valued Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Replication invariant Y Y Y Y N Y Y
Pairwise Y Y Y Y N Y Y
Monotone Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Strongly monotone Y Y Y Y Y N N
5.2 Logical Relations Regarding Young & Levenglick Characterization
of the Kemeny Rule
In this subsection we show that the two sets of characterizing conditions of the Kemeny can be
deduced from one another directly. First, in Lemma 14 and 15, it is proved that the conditions of
Young and Levenglick imply the characterizing conditions of Theorem 2.
Lemma 14 Strong monotonicity is implied by neutrality, consistency and the Condorcet condition.
Proof. Let ϕ be such a rule. Let p and q be profiles and i an agent such that p|N−{i} = q|N−{i}
and q(i) is an elementary change of p(i) in ab. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ(q) = Lab ∩ ϕ(p) in
case Lab ∩ ϕ(p) 6= ∅. Let r = (p, p, pi(1, ab)), then D(r) = 2D(q). Also the Condorcet condition
implies that ϕ(pi(1, ab)) = Lab. Consistency implies ϕ(r) = ϕ(p)∩Lab as Lab ∩ϕ(p) 6= ∅. In view of
Remark 6 , ϕ(q) = ϕ(r) = ϕ(p) ∩ Lab.
Lemma 15 Pareto optimality is implied by neutrality, consistency and the Condorcet condition.
Proof. Let ϕ be a neutral and consistent rule which satisfies the Condorcet condition. Let p be
a profile in LN and let a and b be two different alternatives such that .a.b. = p(i) for all agents i
in N . And, to the contrary, let R ∈ ϕ(p) with .b.a. = R. First, we prove that in this case we may
take p such that .ab. = p(i) for all agents i in N. Let .ax1x2...xtb. = p(j) for some agent j. Let
s be the smallest number such that .xs.a. = R assuming that there are xu such that .xu.a. = R.
Consider profile q such that .xsax1x2...xs−1xs+1...xtb. = q(j) and q(i) = p(i) for i ∈ N − {j}.
Clearly q(j) ⊆ p(j) ∪R, hence by monotonicity, which holds by Lemma 14, we have that R ∈ ϕ(q)
where .a.b. = q(i) for all agents i in N . In case for all xu we have that .a.xu. = R. we may
take q(j) = .ax1x2...xt−1bxt. and have the same result. Therefore, by the finiteness of the set of
alternatives, we may assume that .ab. = p(i) for all agents i in N . Next, consider the permutation
σ on A such that σ(a) = b, σ(b) = a and σ(x) = x for all alternatives x ∈ A − {a, b}. Note that
σp(i) ⊆ p(i)∪R for all agents i in N. Hence, similar as in Lemma 14 we find that ϕ(σp) = ϕ(p)∩Lba.
Hence, ϕ(σp) ⊆ Lba. But neutrality implies that ϕ(σp) = σ(ϕ(p)) and as R ∈ ϕ(p) this yields the
contradiction that σR ∈ ϕ(σp) that is ϕ(σp) ∩ Lab 6= ∅.
Note that Lemma 1 in Young and Levenglick (1978) shows that neutrality, consistency and the
Condorcet condition implies pairwiseness. So, all together, the conditions of Young and Levenglick
-neutrality, consistency and the Condorcet condition- imply the set of conditions: Pareto optimality,
neutrality, pairwiseness, consistency and monotonicity. The latter set is the set of characterizing
conditions used in Theorem 2.
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Next, we show that this latter set of conditions implies the former, which actually boils down
to the following Lemma.
Lemma 16 Pareto optimality, neutrality, pairwiseness, consistency and monotonicity imply the
Condorcet condition.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto optimal, neutral, consistent, pairwise and monotone rule. Let p be a
profile in LN . Let c and d be two different alternatives and R in L such that .cd. = R and R ∈ ϕ(p).
Claim: There is a profile q, an update of p towards R, such that R ∈ ϕ(q), M(p)cd = M(q)cd
and .cd. = q(i) or .dc. = q(i) for all agents i in N.
Proof of Claim Take agent j arbitrarily. We distinguish two cases.
Case .cx1x2...xtd. = p(j). Define profile r by r(i) = p(i) for i ∈ N − {j}. In case there is a
smallest number s such that .xs.cd. = R defined r(j) = .xscx1x2...xs−1xs+1...xtd.. If R is such that
.cd.xs. = R for all s take r(j) = .cx1x2...xt−1dxt..Then r is an update of p towards R such that
M(p)cd = M(r)cd, M(p)cd = M(r)cd and by monotonicity we have R ∈ ϕ(r).
Case .dx1x2...xtc. = p(j). Define profile r by r(i) = p(i) for i ∈ N − {j}. In case there is a
smallest number s such that .xs.cd. = R defined r(j) = .xsdx1x2...xs−1xs+1...xtc.. If R is such that
.cd.xs. = R for all s take r(j) = .dx1x2...xt−1cxt.. Then r is an update of p towards R such that
M(p)cd = M(r)cd, M(p)cd = M(r)cd and by monotonicity we have R ∈ ϕ(r).
Repeating these cases a finite number of times yields the desired result.
End of proof of Claim:
Let a be an alternative such that D(p)ax ≥ 0 for all alternatives x in A − {a}. In order to
prove the second part of the Condorcet condition let D(p)ay = 0 for some alternative y in A−{a}.
Let {c, d} = {a, y} and .cd. = R for some linear order in ϕ(p).We have to prove that R′ = .dc.
which forms with R an elementary change in c and d is in ϕ(p).Consider the permutation σ on
A such that σ(a) = y, σ(y) = a and σ(z) = z for all z ∈ A − {a, y}. Take q as in the foregoing
claim. Then D(q)ay = D(q)ya = 0 and strong monotonicity (which follows from Lemma 13) implies
R ∈ ϕ(q) ⊆ ϕ(p). Neutrality now implies R′ ∈ ϕ(σq). But as for all agents i either .ay. = q(i) or
.ya. = q(i) and D(q)ay = D(q)ya = 0 it follows that M(q) = M(σq). Hence, pairwiseness implies
R′ ∈ ϕ(q) ⊆ ϕ(p), which proves the second part of the Condorcet condition.
In order to prove the first part of the Condorcet condition let D(p)ay > 0 and let to the contrary
.ya. = R′′ be in ϕ(p). Consider a profile r which consists of two times p and almost maximal
conflict profile pi(D(p)ay, ya).So, r = (p, p, pi(D(p)ay, ya)). Then consistency and Lemma 10 imply
ϕ(r) = ϕ(p) ∩ Lya. Hence, R′′ ∈ ϕ(r) ⊆ Lya. But D(r)ax = 2D(p)ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A− {a, y} and
D(r)ay = D(r)ya = 0. Hence, as R
′′ ∈ ϕ(r) the second part of the Condorcet condition implies
ϕ(r) ∩ Lay 6= ∅ which contradicts ϕ(r) ⊆ Lya.
5.3 Possible Variations in the Concept of Update and Monotonicity
By different variations in the concept of an update, one may acquire various conditions in a similar
manner. We define Kemeny-update monotonicity as the ability of a rule to preserve the collective
preferences whenever the preference profile is updated towards the collective preference in terms of
a decrease in Kemeny5 distance of each individual preference to the collective preference. Similarly,
extreme-update monotonicity requires that a rule preserves the collective preference whenever some
5Kemeny distance counts the number of ordered pairs on which two binary relations i.e., strict preferences, are
different. Note that one may formulate distance based conformity with respect to other metrics, however for our
model we restrict our attention to Kemeny metric.
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(possibly all) individuals identically imitate the same collective preference while others remain
unchanged. Note that Kemeny-update monotonicity is the strongest of all variations mentioned
whereas extreme-update monotonicity is the weakest.
Kemeny-update monotonicity: A rule is (strongly) Kemeny-update monotone if for all profiles
p ∈ LN , and for all R ∈ ϕ (p), and for all q ∈ LN such that δ (q(i), R) ≤ δ (p(i), R) for all i ∈ N ,
R ∈ ϕ (q)
(and in addition ϕ(q) ⊆ ϕ(p)).
Note that in the regular update monotonicity condition, the betweenness requirement, already
implied a decrease in the distance between the individual preference and the outcome. Dropping this
leads to a strenghtening of the monotonicity condition to the extent that even the Kemeny rule is
not Kemeny-update monotone. In Can and Storcken (2011), it is shown that strong Kemeny-update
monotonicity leads to so called impossibility theorems.
One can also only consider transformations of profiles in which some agents identically copy the
outcome and the rest remain the same. In such extreme updates of collective preference, we have
a much more weaker update monotonicity condition:
Extreme-update monotonicity: A rule is extreme-update monotone if for all profiles p ∈ LN ,
and for all R ∈ ϕ (p), and for all q ∈ LN such that q (i) ∈ {R, p (i)} for all i ∈ N ,
R ∈ ϕ (q) .
Extreme-update monotonicity is the least demanding of all since it requires that a rule preserves
the outcome only when some agents copy the outcome while the rest remains as they are. In that
context, it resembles the simple monotonicity condition in collective choice rules. However weak
extreme-update monotonicity may be; most rules, including Borda and other score rules, still
fail to satisfy it. For instance, let A = {a, b, c}, and n = 4 and consider a profile p, such that
individuals respectively have the following preferences: abc, bac, acb, cab. Consider the Borda rule,
ϕBorda (p) = {abc, acb}. Consider, now, the extreme update q of p towards acb, where individuals
respectively have, abc, bac, acb, acb, i.e. 4th individual imitated one of the outcomes. It is easy to
see, however, that ϕ (q) = {abc} is the unique collective preference at the updated profile.
5.4 Update Monotone Welfare Functions
In this subsection we consider single valued rules, which are also known as welfare functions. Because
a singleton set is convex, such rules are convex valued. Furthermore, it is easy to see that monotone
single valued rules are strongly monotone. The selective Kemeny rule is an example of a non trivial
monotone welfare function. Similarly, selective super majority rules ψg can be defined by assigning
to a profile p that order in ϕg (p) having the smallest index. It is straightforward to prove that
selective super majority rules are Pareto optimal, replication invariant, pairwise and (strongly)
monotone. They violate, however, the conditions of neutrality and consistency. The condition of
neutrality is also violated by selective Kemeny rules. In view of Lemma 4, it is straightforward that
rules satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 cannot be single valued. Similarly, welfare functions
that are Pareto optimal, neutral and monotone cannot be replication invariant. We leave the study
of welfare functions satisfying those conditions, except replication invariance, for future research.
As hinted in the discussion, there is a strong logical relationship between strategy-proofness
and monotonicity conditions in the choice rules framework. Bossert and Storcken (1992) analyze
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strategy-proofness for single valued preference correspondences with the following result. Let A
contain at least 4 alternatives and fix N, such that #N is even: then, there does not exist a
welfare function which is simutaneously, nonimposed, coalitional strategy-proof and weakly extrema
independent. Nonimposition, which is in fact implied by Pareto optimality, means that the function
is surjective, i.e. the range of the welfare function is the complete set of linear order. Weak extrema
independence is formally introduced below:
Definition 3 A welfare function ψ is weakly extrema independent if for any two profiles p and q
orders R1, R2, R̂1and R̂2 and disjoint coalitions S and T such that:
#S = #T
p(i) = R1, q(i) = R̂1 for i ∈ S
p(i) = R2, q(i) = R̂2 for i ∈ T
p(i) = q(i) /∈ {R1, R2, R̂1, R̂2} for i ∈ N − (S ∪ T ),
p(N), q(N) ⊆ LR1∩R2 = LR̂1∩R̂2 .
we have ψ (p) = ψ (q).
Proposition 3 Selective Kemeny rules are weakly extrema independent.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that for two profiles as defined in Definition 3, ϕKemeny(p) =
ϕKemeny(q). Since Kemeny rule is pairwise it is sufficient to show that M(p) = M(q). Note that
LR1∩R2 = LR̂1∩R̂2 is equivalent to R1 ∩ R2 = R̂1 ∩ R̂2. Furthermore, as p|(S∪T ) = (RS1 , RT2 ) and
q|(S∪T ) = (R̂S1 , R̂T2 ), R1 ∩R2 = R̂1 ∩ R̂2 and #S = #T it follows, although a bit cumbersome, that
M(p|(S∪T )) = M(q|(S∪T )). Of course M(p|N−(S∪T )) = M(q|N−(S∪T )). So, M(p) = M(p|(S∪T )) +
M(p|N−(S∪T )) = M(q|(S∪T )) +M(q|N−(S∪T )) = M(q).
Remark 7 Note that the condition #S = #T is essential in proving that selective Kemeny rules
are pairwise. Indeed the more demanding condition of extrema independence, at which this equality
is not required, is not implied by pairwiseness. Selective Kemeny rules are not extrema independent
which can be deduced by considering for instance maximal conflicts p = (RS1 ,− RN−S1 ) and q =
(R̂S1 ,− R̂N−S1 ) where #S > #N − S. Then ψKemeny(p) = ϕKemeny(p) = {R1} and ψKemeny(q) =
ϕKemeny(q) = {R̂1}. 4
As selective Kemeny rules are Pareto, hence nonimposed, and weakly extreme independent, it
follows that they are not coalitional strategy-proof. Indeed consider N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c} and
profiles p, q such that p(1) = R6 = bac, p(2) = q(2) = R4 = cba, q(1) = R1 = abc (although
redundant for this example may take further R2 = acb, R3 = cab and R4 = cba). Then based on
the indexation of the linear orders ψKemeny(p) = {R4} and ψKemeny(q) = {R1}. As R1 is strictly
closer to p(1) than R4 it follows that ψKemeny is not strategy-proof and therewith not coalitional
strategy-proof. Similarly, selective super majority rules ψg are weakly extrema independent, non
strategy-proof and not extrema independent.
Most probably, under some kind of non-bossiness condition, strategy-proofness implies update
monotonicity. We stop here, however, as we hope that the above has convinced the reader that this
subject is at least for the time being interesting enough to investigate further.
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6 Appendix
The following Proposition shows that intersections of subsets, being sufficiently large, are not empty.
Proposition 4 Let T 1 up to T l be a collection of l subsets of finite and non-empty set N such that
#T j > (l − 1) ·#N/l. Then ∩{T j : j ∈ {1, ..., l}} 6= ∅.
Proof. To prove the contra position suppose ∩{T j : j ∈ {1, ..., l}} = ∅. Now we may take T j such
that for all i in N there are precisely l − 1 sets say T i1 up to T il−1 such that i is in each of these.
So, as
l∑
j=1
#T j =
∑
i∈N
#{T j : i ∈ T j}
it follows that
l∑
j=1
#T j = #N · (l − 1). Let #T 1 ≤ #T j for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. Then #T 1 · l ≤
l∑
j=1
#T j = #N · (l − 1). But then #T 1 ≤ (l − 1) ·#N/l, which proves the contra position.
Next we discuss a result on linear orders concerning the Kemeny distance.
Proposition 5 Let R and Rab be two linear orders in Lab. Let Rba = σabRab, where σab is the
permutation on A such that σab(a) = b, σab(b) = a and σab(c) = c for all c ∈ A − {a, b}. Then
δ(R,Rab) < δ(R,Rba).
Proof. Let R
ba
, R
ab ∈ L be two linear orders that are between Rba and R such that Rba and Rab
form an elementary change in ba. Then it is straightforward to see that δ(R
ba
, Rba) = δ(R
ab
, Rab).
Furthermore by betweenness, δ(R,Rba) = δ(R,R
ab
) + δ(R
ab
, R
ba
) + δ(R
ba
, Rba). By triangular
inequality, δ(R,Rab) ≤ δ(R,Rab) + δ(Rab, Rab) = δ(R,Rab) + δ(Rba, Rba). Hence δ(R,Rab) <
δ(R,Rba).
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